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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LUIS A. GUZMAN, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20040647-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* it * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does admission of an eyewitness's testimony concerning his or her level of 
confidence in an identification violate the due process clause of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting confidence testimony under rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. uThe 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
A trial court's decision to admit an eyewitness identification is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 & n.3 (Utah 1991). The 
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings, reversing "only if they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence." Id. at 782 & n.3. 
Because defendant did not challenge below the confidence testimony under rule 403, 
this Court will not consider the issue for the first time on appeal unless defendant 
demonstrates plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f^ 
45;UtahR.Evid. 103(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah R.Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged defendant and one of his accomplices, Fernando Alberto 
Fernandez, with aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. R. 3-5,92-95. Defendant 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over for trial. See R. 26, 
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52. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Fernandez pled guilty to a reduced charge of robbery and 
agreed to testify for the State. R. 254: 248, 256-58. 
In a pretrial motion, defendant asked the trial court to exclude evidence pertaining to 
the victim's confidence level in her identification of defendant. R. 72-74. The trial court 
denied the motion. R. 253:21-22. Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as 
charged. R. 98-99, 149-51, 200-01, 253-55. The jury also found that defendant used a 
firearm and acted in concert with two or more persons, subjecting defendant to enhanced 
penalties under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203 and -203.1 (Supp. 2000). Defendant was 
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of six years-to-life for aggravated robbery and fifteen 
years-to-life for aggravated kidnapping. R. 221-22. He was also ordered to pay restitution. 
R. 222. 
Fifty-five days after sentencing, defendant filed a notice of appeal, together with a 
motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(e). R. 
228-32. The trial court granted the motion. R. 236-37. The Supreme Court thereafter 
transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(1996). In a 3-0 published decision, the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Guzman, 2004 
UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302. This Court granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Planning a Robbery 
On the afternoon of April 18,2001, defendant (known as "Shorty"), his brother Pato, 
Miguel Pille, Fernando Fernandez (known as "Clown"), a woman named Miguella, and two 
men known as Smiley and Trigger met at a park in Midvale, where they used cocaine and 
methamphetamine. See R. 254: 242-44, 253-54, 263, 277. At Pille's suggestion, the blue 
clad group decided to raid a drug house in South Salt Lake for cocaine and money. R. 254: 
243-44, 253-55, 274, 282. In planning the robbery, the group decided that defendant and 
Miguella would gain entry first and then telephone the others to follow. See R. 254: 244, 
246,263. In need of transportation, Fernandez called his friend Pablo who owned a van. R. 
254: 254, 277. 
After Pablo's arrival, defendant and Miguella left for the drug house in defendant's 
car, followed by the others in Pablo's van. R. 254: 253, 263-65. After parking down the 
street, someone from the group gave defendant a gun. R. 254: 244-45. Defendant and 
Miguella walked toward the house while the others waited in the van. R. 254: 244-46,264. 
The Wrong House 
At approximately 6:00 p.m., twenty-two-year-old Claryn Miller left for her home 
from the restaurant where she worked. R. 253: 123-24, 148-49. As she approached her 
South Salt Lake town house, she passed a man and woman—defendant and Miguella— 
walking down the street towards her house. R. 253: 124-27, 149-50. She activated her 
automatic door, drove into the garage, and shut off the engine. R. 253: 124-25,151. As she 
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gathered her belongings inside the car, defendant entered the garage with Miguella and 
knocked o driver's side window. R. 253: 125-26. Thinking that, he might be looking 
for someone, Claryn rolled down her window. R. 253: 126. 
In broken English, defendant began demanding money and drugs. See R. 253: 126, 
152. Wl len Clary nsa id that she did not know ' \ hat he was talkii lg about, defendant lifted up 
his shirt, exposing a handgun, and demanded that she "[c]lose the f_ing garage." R. 253: 
126. Defendant then opened the car door, pulled the gun from his waist, and showed Claryn 
that it was ... iL 253: 127. 1 lepi it the gun to Clai > n's head and ordered her out of the 
car. R.253: 127,152. 
After Claryn exited the car, defendant put the gun to her back and took a cell phone 
that she had tried to conceal in her pocket. R. 253: 127-28,1- • .' Defendant pushed 
Claryn down onto the garage floor and tied her hands and feet together behind her back with 
a pair of nylons. R. 253: 129-30, 153. He yelled and cursed at Claryn, repeatedly 
demanding money and drugs. R. 253: 127-29 -32. Claryn explained that only she and 
three other giris h ' ' ' • •> . * •' ' : ^ ••• -• iM = -• •. I*-!' •'-• >u u'i-r he 
was talking about and that the only money she had was the six dollars in her wallet inside the 
car. R.253: 127-29, 140. Unpersuaded, defendant called her a liar. R. 253: 127-28. He 
retrieved the wallet from the seat of her car, and after discovering oi ily six dollars, tl :i rew it at 
her. R.253: 140, 160-61. 
Defendant then entered the house through the garage door, leaving Miguella with 
Claryn. See R. 253: 133, 1 4 1 < t.5, 153 54, 15 ] Defendant teleph- >ned his cohorts waiting 
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outside, and after they knocked on the front door, let them inside. R. 253: 133-34, 154-55, 
168; R. 254:246,267-68,271.l Pablo remained in the van. R. 254:271-72. After entering, 
the men ransacked the house looking for drugs and money. R. 253:144-45,154-55,157-59; 
see also R. 254: 269. They found none, but took two rings, some cigarettes, and a second 
cell phone. R. 253: 139-40; R. 254: 250-51. 
Defendant returned to the garage periodically. R.253: 144-45,154-55,157;R.254: 
252. During the encounter, Claryn looked up at defendant some twenty times, until he 
insisted that she keep her face down. R. 253:132. At one point, a man with a "clown-jester-
type" tattoo over his right eye, later identified as Fernando Fernandez, looked in the garage at 
Claryn, along with another man. R. 253: 133-35, 155, 171; R. 254: 247, 250, 269. After 
rummaging through the house for 15 to 20 minutes, the men decided to leave. R. 253: 133. 
Defendant asked the men whether he should kill Claryn. R. 254:247. Fernandez told him to 
leave her alone. R. 254:247. A fourth man stepped into the garage and told Claryn they had 
the wrong house and would be leaving. R. 253:134. He then turned and instructed everyone 
not to touch Claryn. R. 253: 134. 
After the men left, Claryn continued to lie on the garage floor, fearful they would 
return. R. 253: 135. After a few minutes of waiting, she freed herself and walked into the 
kitchen. R. 253: 135-36,157. Traumatized by the incident, Claryn vomited on the kitchen 
floor. R. 253: 136. Claryn drove to work where she told a co-worker what had happened. 
1
 Claryn testified that she believed defendant opened the door. R. 253: 155. 
Fernandez, however, testified that Miguella opened the door. R. 254: 246, 268. 
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R. 253: 136-37. He drove her to the house of her neighbor, who was a police officer. R. 
253:138,159; R. 254: 180. rhe neighbor dialed police ai u ; iaryn reported the incident. R. 
253: 138. Officer Frank Fisher was the first officer on the scene, arriving at approximately 
9:00 p.m. R. 254:179,201. Claryn briefly described what happened, but Officer Fisher did 
not take a formal statement because Claryn was still very distraught, crying and shaking. R. 
254: 180-83,187. 
Identification of Defendant 
A week or two following the robbery, Claryn met with Officer Matt Jewkes, first at 
• : . • ' . • :>„ . v. i$5\ 162; R. 25- % 20 7-08. She 
recounted the robbery and provided a description of the perpetrators. R. 253: 162, 165; R. 
254: 208,214-16. Based on those descriptions, police prepared two photo arrays. The first 
included a pholoiiniph nlTeriuindn Fernandez,, positioned in tin, number 2 slot, S ee R. 253: 
162-63; R. 254: 221; SE2. The second included defendant's photograph, positioned in the 
number 5 slot See R. 254: 210-11, 216, 221, 234; SE1. 
< \ lay 23, 2001, just over a month after the robbery, Officer Jewkes and another 
detective met with Claryn at her place of employment to have her look at the photo arrays. 
R. 253:141-44; R. 254: 210,231-32. Officer Jewkes instructed Claryn to look through the 
photographs in each photo array, and if she recognized anyone, to so indicate. R. 253: 142; 
R. 254: 210-13,232. He also asked that she rate her level of certainty in arv ide*u m aiion 
on a scale of 1 to 10. R. 253:142. She identified Fernandez from the first photo array as the 
man with the "clown-jester-type" tattoo over his eye and rated her level of certainty at 6 or 7. 
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R. 253: 143-44,163-64; R. 254: 213. She identified defendant from the second photo array 
as the gunman and rated her level of certainty at 10. R. 253: 142-43, 164,169; R. 254: 210-
11; SE3. Officer Jewkes also presented two other photo arrays, one of men and one of 
women, but Claryn was unable to identify anyone from those photo arrays. R. 254: 216, 
234. A week or two later, Officer Jewkes informed Claryn that she had identified two of the 
suspects. R. 253: 166; but see R. 254: 233-34. 
On July 6,2001, Fernandez waived his right to remain silent and spoke with Officer 
Jewkes. R. 254:235,239-40,249. He admitted that defendant and Miguellahad entered the 
house to commit the robbery. See R. 254:249. However, he told Officer Jewkes that he and 
the others never entered the house. See R. 254: 249-50. In a later interview with police, he 
gave the names of all those who participated in the robbery. R. 254: 251, 261-63. 
Some nine months later, Claryn went to the police station to view a line up arranged 
by defense counsel. R. 253:146,170. She again identified defendant, who was fifth in the 
line up, indicating that she was 100 percent certain that he was the gunman. R. 253: 146-47, 
166-67,170. 
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L Confidence Testimony, Defendant claims that testimony from an eyewitness 
regarding her level of certainty in identifying the defendant is inherently unreliable and thus 
inadmissible umlei siak' due process. No decision of Ihis t1ourt has so held. Although this 
Court has chosen not to include witness confidence as a factor to be considered as a matter of 
law in examining the reliability of an identification, it has not indicated that confidence 
testimony should be inadmissible at trial, Io the contrary, the decisions of this Court suggest 
that juries may consider confidence testimony. Moreover, the research suggests that there is 
a positive correlation between eyewitness confidence and identification accuracy. To the 
extent juries give too much weight to confidence testimony and are unaware of the factors 
that, affect • confidence-accuracy correlation, a defendant may seek to adi nit expert 
testimony on the subject or ask for an appropriate instruction. Defendant asked for neither. 
Finally, any alleged error in admitting the confidence testimony was harmless because (1) a 
co-perpetrator implicated defendant in the i obber> , and (2) the victim's testimony would 
have been equally persuasive absent her confidence assessment. 
II. Rule 403. Defendant also claims that the confidence testimony should have been 
excluded under rule -HH I Kah Rules of Evidence. Although the court of appeals addressed 
the merits of defendant's claim, it was error for it to do so. Defendant did not raise a rule 
403 objection below and did not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
This Court should therefore vacate the court of appeals's holding and should not address the 
claim. In any event, defendant's rule 403 claim fails on the inerits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ADMISSION OF CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY DOES NOT VIOLATE A 
DEFENDANT'S STATE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The court of appeals held that admission of a witness's confidence level in her pretrial 
identifications does not violate a defendant's state due process rights. See Guzman, 2004 UT 
App 211, K 39.2 The court concluded that precedent from this Court establishes that although 
"certainty testimony is not a separate admissibility factor," it is "relevant once the eyewitness 
identification is deemed admissible, insofar as it assists the jury's evaluation of the 
credibility of the identification testimony and the weight to be accorded it." Id, at f 31. The 
court further concluded that confidence testimony may also "be relevant in the trial court's 
admissibility assessment, insofar as it sheds light on the spontaneity/consistency 
admissibility factor." Id. 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals holding is incorrect. He argues that 
precedent from this Court, "when viewed in the light of continuing scientific research," 
dictates the exclusion of confidence testimony under the due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution (article I, section 7). Pet. Brf. at 12-24. Defendant misapprehends the holdings 
of this Court's decisions and overstates the legal research. The court of appeals holding is 
correct. 
The court of appeals also held that admission of confidence testimony does not 
violate a defendant's federal due process rights. See Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, f^lj 17, 39. 
That holding is not at issue on certiorari. 
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A THIS COURT'S DECISIONS HOLD THAT CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY MAY BE 
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY OF AN EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION, 
This Court has issued four major decisions addressing the admissibility and. ji iry 
consideration of eyewitness identifications: State v. Long, 111 P.2d483 (Utah 1986), State v. 
Ramirez, , ~11A (Utah 1991), State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265, and State v. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,48 P.3d 953. These cases have allowed juries to e< Misidcr confidence 
testimony. 
1
 State v. I ong. 
in Long, the prosecution'5; case of aggravated assault 'inured on the uncorroborated 
eyewitness testimony of a single witness—the victim of the crime," 721 P.2d at 487. This 
Court reversed Long's conviction because the trial court refused to give a requested jury 
instruction detailing some of the factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications. Id. at 487, 494 & n.7.3 
In reversing, the Court noted the well-documented reality that "human perception is 
inexact nnl dial human nicinnn is both limited and fallible." Id. at 488. The Court 
discussed the "wide variety of factors" that adversely affect the accuracy of an individual's 
memory, including those that are not commonly understood and that are even counter-
intuitive. A /. ot 4 KK ILH) I (H; ('oi 11 ( observed that "jurors are, for the most part, unaware of 
Long's requested instruction was patterned after that suggested in United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. ! ^2 ) . Long, 721 P.2d at 492. The Telfaire 
instruction directed the jury to consider, among other factors, "the strength of the 
identification." Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. 
these problems," and that for this reason, jurors give "great weight" to eyewitness testimony. 
Id. at 490. To remedy this shortcoming, Long directed trial courts to give a cautionary 
instruction "whenever eyewitness identification is central in a case and such an instruction is 
requested by the defense. Id. at 492. 
Long held that "a proper instruction should sensitize the jury to the factors that 
empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications, especially those that laypersons most likely would not 
appreciate." Id. The Court left to trial courts and counsel the task of producing appropriate 
instructions, but held that at a minimum such instructions should direct the jury to consider 
the following factors: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 493. 
Absent from this list of factors is a witness's level of certainty in his or her 
identification—a factor the United States Supreme Court applies in assessing reliability 
under federal due process. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382 
(1972). Long did not include that factor because of research that "undermined the common 
notion that the confidence with which an individual makes an identification is a valid 
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indicator of the accuracy of the recollection." 721 P.2d at 490. The Court observed that in 
one study finding a poor confidence-accuracy relationship, the researchers concluded that it 
is "possible" thai ihc jurors' level nlYnnluleiiee uas ini'ji irrespective of the actual rate of 
witness accuracy.'" Id. at 490-91 (quoting Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay, & rain I 
Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. 
ApplK^/^. 
As acknowledged by defendant, the Court did not hold that confidence testimony 
should be excluded. See id. at 492. And notably, the Court did not require that the 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness testimony include an admonition that there is "no 
correlation" between eyewitness confidence and idei itification * M:^cy, 
1, Stale v. Ramirez. 
In Ramirez, two men wearing scarfs over their faces robbed a Pizza Hut just before 
1:00 a.m. * manager of I lie restaurant was leavini.! wilh her husband and brother. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 776. Shortly after the robbery, a police officer stopped Ramirez a few 
blocks away for unrelated questioning. Id. at 776-77. When a backup officer recognized 
R amirez as apossible suspect in Ihc robbery, Ramirez was handcuffed to a chain link fence 
and the three robbery victims were transported to that location for a showup, Id. at 777. 
From the backseat of the patrol car, the three victims viewed Ramirez as police trained their 
headlights on hiii 1 I / "1 1 le mai lager's bi other identified Ramirez, who was surrounded by 
officers, as the gunman in the robbery. Id. The manager and her husband wax unable lo 
identify him. Id. 
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Ramirez claimed that admission of the eyewitness identification violated his right to 
due process under the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 778. The Court explained that 
before identification evidence may be introduced at trial, federal and state due process 
requires trial courts to make a preliminary determination that the identification is sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted in evidence. Id. at 778-79. Citing Long, the Court noted its 
disagreement with some of the factors used for determining reliability under federal due 
process. Id. at 780. The Court then adopted a separate state due process analysis requiring 
trial courts to conduct "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability" using the five 
factors identified in Long. Id. at 780-81. That analysis is "as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal [due process] analysis . . . ." Id. at 784. Relying on Long's 
criticism of eyewitness confidence, the Court did not include it as a factor courts are required 
to consider in determining the reliability of an identification. Id. at 781. 
3. State v. Hoffhine. 
In Hoffhine, Kiril Boyadjieff was riding his bicycle at 9:00 p.m. when a car hit him 
from behind and knocked him to the ground. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, f^ 2. A man exited the 
passenger side of the car and robbed Boyadjieff at gunpoint. Id. at Yi 2-3. Boyadjieff 
provided police with a description of the robber, a description of the car, and the car's license 
plate number. Id. at j^ 5. Within 90 minutes of the robbery, police stopped defendant and 
another man, who were in a car bearing the license plate number identified by Boyadjieff. 
Id. at Tf 6. Police took Boyadjieff to the location of the stop and each man was presented to 
Boyadjieff from outside with spotlights trained on him. Id. at | 7. Boyadjieff identified 
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defendant as the robber, but was unable to identify the first man. Id. When asked how sure 
he was about the identification, Boyadjieff "said he was a 'nine and a half on a ten point 
scale." Id. 
At the preliminary hearing, Boyadjieff acknowledged that he had positively identified 
defendant as the robber, but indicated that "as he was testifying he was not [now] sure that 
defendant was in fact the robber." Id at \ 9 He explained that he idei itified defendant 
because he "'looked a lot more like the person [he] saw' than the first suspect brought out." 
Id. Defendant thereafter moved to suppress the identification. Id. at f 10. Because 
Boyadjieff expressed less certain^ - lentification at the pi eliminai > hearing, the trial. 
court granted the motion, prohibiting any testimony that Boyadjieff positively identified 
defendant at the showup. Id. at ffl[ 10,13,16. However, the court allowed testimony about 
the cm *unistances sun ounding the Identification, including the victim's description of the 
robber and the description of the person at the show up. Id. at fflf 1 u, • > i * . v. * • : 
defendant of the robbery. Id. at f 11. A few weeks after trial, Boyadjieff signed an affidavit 
indicating that "he was now certain that defendant was not the person who robbed him." Id. 
at 11. Based on that affidavit, defendant filed a motion for »i i * ^ • ^ ' ..:-:* i \- ; c 
alternative, for a new trial. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at ^ | 11-12. 
On appeal, this Coin t reiterated that "[t]he purpose of analyzing the facts under the 
Ramirez test is for the trial court to determine, as a thi esh : Id matter, i \ lietl lei die 
identification is constitutionally reliable and thus, whether it can properly be admitted into 
evidence." Id. at 1 The Court held that where the trial court had ruled "the showup was 
15 
suggestive and did not satisfy the Ramirez factors for constitutional reliability," it was error 
for it to admit any evidence of the identification. Id. The Court nevertheless affirmed 
Hoffhine's conviction, concluding that any error was harmless because, contrary to the trial 
court's ruling, Boyadjieff s identification satisfied the Ramirez test and thus "could have 
been admitted in its entirety." Id. at \ 17. Noting that level of certainty is not a factor in 
determining the admissibility of an identification, the Court criticized the trial court's 
conclusion that "the showup 'resulted in a non-identification,'" which conclusion was 
apparently based on Boyadjieff s less than certain identification. Id. at ^ f 16. After reviewing 
the five Long factors, the Court held that Boyadjieff s identification of defendant "met the 
threshold test for constitutional reliability . . . ." Id. at fflf 18-19. 
Notably, the Court considered Boyadjieff s level of certainty in examining the 
spontaneity and consistency of the identification—the fourth factor of the Ramirez test. Id. 
at ^ | 18 & n.3. And having concluded that the identification was constitutionally reliable, the 
Court held that "all evidence of the show up could have been admitted." Id. at f 19 
(emphasis added). That evidence included the victim's level of certainty in his 
identification. Id. at ^[ 7,18 n.3. Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, Resp. Brf. at 22-23, 
Hoffhine supports the rule that once an identification is found reliable, confidence testimony 
is admissible at trial. 
4. State v. Hubbard. 
In Hubbard, a man identifying himself as "Six Nine" forced his way into an 
apartment, shot the tenant in the leg, threatened the tenant's guests with a gun, binding one 
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of them with duct tape, and took cash and marijuana from the apartment. Hubbard, 2002 UT 
45, ffif 3-6. Three weeks later, police presented to the tenant and one of his guests a photo 
array that included a photograph of defendant—who used the moniker "Six Nine" and 
matched the description provided by the tenant and guest. Id. at ffl[ 7-8. The tenant 
"immediately, and without equivocation, identified defendant as the assailant." Id. at f 8. 
When asked to assign a numerical value from one to ten indicating his confidence level, with 
ten being positively certain, the tenant said, "I'm positive." Id. When the guest viewed the 
photo array, she too "immediately identified defendant" and "indicated her certainty as seven 
on the same ten point scale." Id. Hubbard filed a motion to suppress the identification 
evidence as unreliable, but the court denied the motion. Id. at \ 9. A jury convicted 
defendant of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Id. at \ 12. 
In affirming the trial court's reliability ruling, this Court observed that "[sjince Long 
[it has] used five factors as a test for analyzing, as a preliminary constitutional matter, 
whether an eyewitness identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury." Id. 
at % 26. However, the Court held that "[w]hile [the Long] factors provide guidance, the list is 
certainly not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining 
whether an identification is reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process." Id. Then, 
in considering the admissibility of the eyewitness identification, the Court observed: 
The witnesses' identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter. [The tenant] . . . identified defendant as the assailant 
immediately, and without hesitation or equivocation. When asked to describe 
his certainty to Officer Merino, [the tenant] said, "I'mpositive." [His guest] 
immediately identified defendant and indicated her level of certainty as 
seven on the ten point scale. 
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Id. at Tf 28 (emphasis added). Hubbard thus specifically relied on witness confidence in its 
examination of the constitutional reliability of a witnesses' identification. 
* * * 
The teaching of these cases is simple. People already rely too heavily on confidence 
testimony. As a result, neither trial courts nor jurors should be required, as a matter of law, 
to consider confidence testimony when assessing the reliability of an identification. On the 
other hand, the Court has not found confidence testimony so unreliable that it may not be 
considered. Hoffhine, in fact, expressly permits juries to consider all evidence surrounding 
an identification, including confidence testimony. And under Hubbard, trial courts are free 
to consider eyewitness confidence in determining the admissibility of an identification. As 
discussed below, and contrary to defendant's claim on certiorari, the research on the subject 
supports such a position. 
B. RESEARCH DOES NOT SUPPORT A RULE EXCLUDING THE CONSIDERATION 
OF CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY. 
1. Research Has Generally Found a Positive Correlation Between 
Witness Confidence and Accuracy. 
Defendant's argument for the exclusion of confidence testimony rests on the premise 
that a witness's level of certainty "has no reliable correlation to accuracy." Pet. Brf. at 17. 
In support of that premise, defendant cites to Long and its progeny. Pet. Brf. at 17-18. He 
also cites to a number of professional publications addressing the issue. But research on the 
subject since Long has found a positive correlation between witness confidence and 
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identification accuracy (CA correlation). This Court should therefore reject defendant's 
claim. 
Long's decision to exclude eyewitness confidence as one of the factors a jury must 
consider in assessing the accuracy of an identification was based primarily on Kenneth A. 
Deffenbacher's 1980 review of various studies dating back to the early 1900's. See id. 
(citing Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer 
Anything About Their Relationship?" 4 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980)).4 By all 
accounts, the research reported by Deffenbacher produced mixed results. In his survey of 25 
studies involving 43 assessments of the CA correlation, Deffenbacher found "a significant 
positive [correlation" in 22 assessments and a "nonsignificant or reverse (negative) 
correlationf ]" in 21 assessments. Deffenbacher, supra, at 245-46. "Although several 
attempts have been made to account for the disparate results (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1980; 
Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1984), none has proven notably successful.'9 Judith 
McKenna, Molly Treadway, & Michael E. McCloskey, Expert Psychological Testimony on 
Eyewitness Reliability: Selling Psychology Before Its Time, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 283, 288 (1992) (Peter Suedfeld et al. eds., 1992). Subsequent research, however, 
has found a positive CA correlation. 
4
 Long also cited Lindsay, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-
Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations, 66 J. Applied Psycho. 79, 80-82 
(1981); J. Bibicoff, Seeing is Believing? The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 11 San Fernando Valley L. Rev. 95, 104 n. 35 
(1983); and R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 184 (1975). 
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Since 1980, several researchers have examined the CA correlation by analyzing the 
combined results of multiple studies on the CA correlation (meta-analyses). See Steven 
Penrod and Brian Cutler, "Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their 
Forensic Relation" 1 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 817 (1995). In these studies, the 
CA correlation is expressed in "r" units. Id. at 823. "If [jurors] know nothing about the[ ] 
witnesses, then [they] would have to guess whether each witness is correct or incorrect. 
Simple guessing should produce 50% correct guesses and 50% incorrect guesses and a 
corresponding r = 0 . . . . On the other hand, if [jurors] had access to some very useful 
information [(in this case witness confidence)] and could use that information to correctly 
classify 80% of the witnesses (much better than guessing), the strength or usefulness of [that] 
information would be captured with r = .6 . . . . " Id. 
In a 1980 review of 16 studies, Penrod found an average correlation of r = .23. Id. at 
823.5 In a 1984 meta-analysis of 31 studies, Wells and Murray (Wells) found an estimated 
correlation of r = .07. Id.6 In a 1987 review of 35 studies involving 3,953 participants, 
Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham (Bothwell) found an average correlation of r = .25. 
5
 Results of Penrod's meta-analysis were first published in Steven Penrod, Elizabeth 
Loftus, and John Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A Psychological 
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 119, 155-56 (N. Kerr et al. eds. 
1982) 
6
 Results of the Wells meta-analysis were originally reported in Gary Wells and D.M. 
Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, 155,161-62 (Wells, et al. eds., 1984). 
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Id.1 And in a 1995 meta-analysis of 30 studies involving 4,036 participants, Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, and Cutler (Sporer) reported an average correlation of .29. Id. at 824-25.8 
The CA correlation of .07 found by Wells "is relatively useless in any applied sense." 
Wells & Murray, supra, at 162; accord Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, supra, at 691 
(noting that Wells's results are "clearly negligible"). However, the methodology used by 
Wells & Murray has since been discredited by other researchers. See Bothwell, 
Deffenbacher, & Brigham, supra, at 691-92. 
We are thus left with CA correlations of .23, .25, and .29. Penrod and Cutler 
characterized these CA correlation as "weak" to "modest." Penrod & Cutler, supra, at 825, 
842. But Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham recognized that "even a correlation of .25 
cannot be characterized as an effect of negligible size," but is "medium-size in nature." 
Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, supra, at 693. And both Penrod and Wells have 
admitted that the research suggests that "witnesses who are highly confident in their 
identifications are somewhat more likely to be correct as compared to witnesses who display 
little confidence." Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, et al., Eyewitness 
7
 Results of the Bothwell meta-analysis were originally reported in Bothwell, Kenneth 
A. Deffenbacher, & J.C. Brigham, Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: 
Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 Journal of Applied Psychology 691-95 (1987). 
8
 Results of the Sporer meta-analysis were originally reported in Siegfried Ludwig 
Sporer, Steven Penrod, Don Read, & Brian Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 
Psychological Bulletin 315, 319 (1995). 
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Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law and 
Human Behavior 603, 622 (1998). 
Sporer's 1995 meta-analysis shed additional light on the CA correlation. Unlike the 
previous research, Sporer also analyzed the difference in the CA correlation between 
choosers—those who identify a suspect—and nonchoosers—those who make no 
identification. Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, supra, at 315-20. In the analysis, Sporer 
found that the CA correlation "was significantly higher for choosers ... than for nonchoosers 
...." Penrod & Cutler, supra, at 824. For choosers, the average CA correlation was r=.41, 
and for nonchoosers, the CA correlation was only r=.12. Sporer, supra, at 319. As later 
explained by Penrod and Wells, "[t]he 'chooser' versus 'nonchooser' distinction is a 
forensically important one, because it is 'choosers' (and defendants they choose) who 
typically appear in courtrooms." Wells, Small, Penrod, et al., supra, at 622-23. 
In addition, "several recent studies have demonstrated that when witnessing 
conditions are varied to make later identification easier or more difficult (e.g., by shortening 
or extending the time of encoding), a rather substantial relationship can be found between 
identification accuracy and confidence of the eyewitness." John C. Brigham, Adina W. 
Wasserman, & Christian A. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence-
Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Court Review 12, 18 (1999) (citing D. Stephen 
Lindsay, J. Don Read, & Kusum Sharma, Accuracy and Confidence in Person Identification: 
The Relationship is Strong When Witnessing Conditions Vary Widely, 9 Psychological 
Science 215 (1998), and J. Don Read, et al., The Relationship Between Accuracy and 
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Confidence in Eyewitness Identification Studies: Is the Conclusion Changing?, in 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 107 (1997)). 
Some researchers have concluded that "a misapplication of scientific precepts has led 
researchers astray" and that the confidence-accuracy relationship may in fact be relatively 
strong. D. Stephen Lindsay, J. Don Read, & Kusum Sharma, Accuracy and Confidence in 
Person Identification: The Relationship Is Strong When the Witnessing Conditions Vary 
Widely, 9 Psychol. Sci. 215 (1998). Indeed, given the multitude of factors that may affect 
the confidence-accuracy correlation, "[t]he relationship between accuracy and confidence 
may be no weaker than the relationship between accuracy and most other factors available 
for jurors to consider." McKenna, Treadway, & McCloskey, supra, at 288. For example, 
according to McKenna, the available research does not support the simplistic claim (implied 
in Utah's Long instruction) that stress impairs the ability of a witness to accurately recall 
information about a crime and the perpetrator. Id. at 285. Research indicates instead that "as 
arousal or stress increases from very low to very high levels, performance at first improves 
but then, as stress increases beyond some optimal level, declines." Id. Thus, an optimal 
level of stress will actually increase accuracy. Id. at 285-86. The problem, of course, is that 
"the optimal level of stress varies across situations (and probably across individuals)." Id. 
In summary, defendant's "sweeping claim [that a witness who is very confident is no 
more likely to be correct than a witness who expresses uncertainty] is clearly not justified by 
the available psychological research." Id. at 288; accord Legrand, 747 N.Y.2d at 744 (citing 
Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, supra, at 218. 
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2. The Research Does Not Recommend the Exclusion of Confidence 
Testimony 
The State does not suggest that the C A correlation is without problems. Research has 
found that a number of factors may adversely affect the CA correlation. See Penrod & 
Cutler, supra, at 825. For example, witness confidence might be influenced by clues, 
intentional or inadvertent, from the officer conducting the lineup or photo array. Gary L. 
Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Good, You Identified the Supsect: Feedback to Eyewitnesses 
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 Journal of Applied Psychology 360, 
361-62 (1998). Similarly, witness confidence may be inflated if assessed after the witness 
has been given positive feedback, e.g., "Good, you identified the suspect." See id. at 360-75. 
And finally, jurors tend to give too much weight to witness confidence and are unaware of 
some of the factors that affect identification accuracy. 
Notwithstanding those concerns, very few experts recommend that confidence 
testimony be excluded altogether. Instead, researchers have recommended that steps be 
taken "to improve juror sensitivity to the factors that influence eyewitness memory and 
reduce overreliance on factors, such as witness confidence, that have limited diagnosticity." 
Penrod & Cutler, supra at 831, 842 (emphasis added). 
Sporer and Penrod recommend the use of expert testimony to "advise jurors that 
witness confidence is one, but only one indicator of witness accuracy." Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, & Cutler, supra, at 324. They urge experts to inform jurors that witness confidence is 
not a perfect indicator of accuracy and under some circumstances may be a poor or 
misleading indicator. Id. They also suggest that jurors be informed that "witness confidence 
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should, in any event, be considered together with a number of other variables that can 
influence eyewitness performance." Id.9 
Penrod and Cutler have indicated that "the use of special judicial instructions that 
focus on factors known to influence eyewitness identifications would also assist jurors with 
their judgments by providing information that is not within their commonsense knowledge." 
Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven Penrod, and Brian Cutler, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: 
Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 338, 358 
(1997). Similarly, Brigham, Wasserman, and Meissner argue that "[w]ithout proper 
instruction on how each of these factors may affect a witness's perceptual ability, jurors are 
left to rely on their often incorrect, intuitive beliefs about how memory works." Brigham, 
Wasserman, & Meissner, supra, at 25. Leippe has concluded that "[m]ost cases do not 
require an expert," but suggests that any trial involving prominent eyewitness testimony 
include "a brief, simply worded statement by the judge about eyewitness memory." Leippe, 
supra, at 948 n. 5. 
Researchers have also recommended changes in the procedures used at lineups and 
photo arrays. For example, Wells and Penrod recommend implementation of the following 
four rules: (1) the officer conducting the lineup or photo array should be suspect-blind; 
9
 "The empirical data suggest that a general account of research, theory, and the 
stronger known influences on eyewitness memory promotes similar levels of skepticism as 
does testimony that explicitly homes in on the specifics of the witness-at-hand." Michael R. 
Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law 909, 948 (1995). 
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(2) the eyewitness should be told that the suspect might not be present; (3) the suspect should 
not stand out from the others in the lineup, and (4) "[a] clear statement should be taken from 
the eyewitness at the time of the identification and prior to any feedback as to his or her 
confidence that the identified person is the actual culprit" Wells, Small, Penrod, et al., 
supra, at 627-35 (emphasis in original); accord Wells & Bradfield, supra, at 375. 
* * * 
In this case, Officer Jewkes obtained a confidence statement at the time of 
identification, as recommended by Wells and Penrod. R. 253: 142. The risk of confidence 
inflation was thus reduced. The victim also testified that she looked at defendant some 
twenty times, R. 253:132, increasing her exposure to defendant's face and the likelihood of 
a strong CA correlation. See Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, supra, at 18. 
Moreover, defendant had the opportunity to address any concern that the jury would 
give undue weight to witness confidence. He could have sought the admission of expert 
testimony on the confidence-accuracy correlation or insisted on an instruction advising the 
jury that confidence does not necessarily correlate with accuracy. He did neither. In fact, the 
trial court expressed its willingness to give an instruction advising the jury that witness 
confidence is not necessarily indicative of identification accuracy. See R. 253: 19-22. 
Although the Long instruction ultimately given to the jury did not address witness 
confidence, see R. 171-73, defendant did not voice any objection to that instruction or 
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otherwise insist that the jury be instructed on witness confidence, as offered by the trial court 
earlier. See R. 253: 19-22; R. 255: 291-93.10 
Even in the absence of expert testimony or a special instruction on witness 
confidence, the jury was unlikely to give undue weight to Claryn's confidence in her 
identification of defendant. In the first place, a co-perpetrator of the crime implicated 
defendant in the robbery. In the second place, the Long instruction did not include witness 
confidence as a factor or otherwise bring witness confidence to the jury's attention. See R. 
171-73. Moreover, as observed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, it "should come as no 
surprise to the average juror" that witness confidence is not necessarily indicative of 
accuracy. State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Conn. 1999). Thus, even though a 
jury may be advised of this, "there is no basis for assuming that jurors are unaware of this 
point." McKenna, Treadway, & McCloskey, supra, at 288-89. In other words, there was no 
need for such an instruction. 
Before trial, defendant submitted a Long instruction that included a statement 
advising the jury to consider Claryn's confidence testimony with caution and indicating that 
"[s]cience has failed to establish any correlation" between witness confidence and 
identification accuracy. See R. 84. However, as noted, he took no exception to its absence 
when the court addressed the instructions. R. 255: 291-93. 
In any event, defendant's proposed instruction was inappropriate for two reasons. 
First, the research says nothing about the correlation between Claryn's confidence and her 
accuracy. See Jones v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143, 148 (Ga. 2000). As such, the statement that 
the jury should receive Claryn's confidence testimony with caution would have amounted to 
an improper comment by the court on the evidence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (providing that 
"[t]he court shall not comment on the evidence in the case"). Second, as discussed above, 
the research does not generally establish no correlation between witness confidence and 
identification accuracy. The instruction would have thus overstated the research. 
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Moreover, exclusion of confidence testimony would also preclude defense counsel 
from impeaching a witness based on his or her confidence level. For example, defense 
counsel would be precluded from eliciting evidence that a witness was only 40% or 50% 
certain of an identification. In this case, defense counsel could not have impeached Claryn's 
identification of Fernandez by pointing out that she rated her level of certainty in her 
identification of him at only 6 or 7 on a ten-point scale. See R. 253:144. Surely, this is not a 
desirable result for defendants challenging an identification. 
This Court should follow the lead of the Georgia Supreme Court on this issue. In 
Jones v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143, 148 & n.12 (Ga. 2000), the defendant, like defendant here, 
relied on a number of studies that purportedly undermine the notion that a strong correlation 
exists between witness confidence and identification accuracy. The Georgia Supreme Court 
observed, however, that "[t]hese studies . . . do not demonstrate that every eyewitness's 
confidence in the accuracy of his or her testimony is misplaced," but rather, "depict group 
behavior, offering expert information about how groups of people perceive and react as a 
basis for evaluating the claims of an eyewitness in a particular case." Jones, 539 S.E.2d at 
148 (footnotes and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The Georgia Supreme Court thus 
concluded that a witness may testify regarding his or her confidence in an identification 
because the studies "do not render every eyewitness's testimony regarding his or her 
confidence inherently unreliable and inadmissible." Id. The Georgia court held that a jury 
may be advised of the "general lack of a correlation between confidence and accuracy," but 
it retains the right to decide what "weight [is] to be given [confidence] testimony." Id. 
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C. ANY ALLEGED ERROR IS HARMLESS. 
In any event, any supposed error in admitting the confidence testimony is harmless. 
Claryn Miller's testimony regarding the robbery and her identification of defendant as the 
gunman was corroborated by Fernando Fernandez, who also participated in the robbery. See 
R. 254: 242-84. As a result, this was not a case like those in Long, Ramirez, Hoffhine, and 
Hubbardwhere the State's case rested almost entirely on the identification of the defendants 
by witnesses who did not know the defendants. 
In addition, and perhaps more significantly, absent Claryn's testimony that she was 
certain defendant was the gunman who robbed her, we have her still unequivocal 
identification of defendant from the photo array, see R. 253:142-43 (picking out defendant's 
picture as "[t]he man that had the gun to my head"), at the lineup, see R. 253: 146-47 
(identifying defendant at the lineup within "[s]econds, as soon as he walked out"), and again 
at trial, see R. 253: 126-27 (pointing to defendant as the gunman). These simple 
identifications, void of elaboration, exude confidence. They would convey no less certainty 
than Claryn's statements that she was 100 percent confident in her identification. There fore, 
there is no likelihood of a different outcome absent the confidence testimony. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADDRESSING DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 403 CLAIM. 
The court of appeals also rejected defendant's claim that Claryn's confidence 
testimony was unduly prejudicial under rule 403 of Utah Rules of Evidence. Guzman, 2004 
UT App 211, ^f 32-33. The court held that the trial court's decision to admit the testimony 
"was well within the limits of reasonability." Id. at ^ f 33. Because defendant did not raise a 
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rule 403 claim at trial and did not claim plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, 
the court of appeals erred in addressing the merits of defendant's claim. This Court should 
therefore vacate that part of the court of appeals's decision. 
Just two months ago, this Court reaffirmed the well-settled rule that "a timely and 
specific objection must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Finder, 
2005 UT 1 5 4 45 (citing Utah R. Evid. 103(a) and State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 
(Utah 1989)). Under ordinary circumstances, the appellate court '"will not consider an issue 
brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist.5" Id. (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, Tf 16, 94 P.3d 
186). Finder explained that "[w]hen a party seeks review of an unpreserved objection, [the 
Court] require[s] that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate review." 
Id. (citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995)). In other words, the 
appellant must argue plain error or exceptional circumstances in his or her opening brief. Id. 
Defendant did not argue rule 403 in the trial court below. He did not once mention or 
otherwise analyze rule 403 in his motion in limine to exclude the evidence or in his oral 
argument on the motion. See R. 72-74; R. 253: 11-22. Accordingly, defendant was required 
to establish plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 
45. He did neither. See Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. In fact, defendant did not even identify rule 403 
as a separate issue on appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 2. Instead, he made a brief argument on rule 
403 at the end of his discussion on the admissibility of confidence testimony under Long and 
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its progeny. See Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. Not once did he claim plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. See Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. 
In his reply brief, defendant acknowledged that rule 403 was not mentioned below. 
Rply. Brf. at 3. However, he claimed that the issue was nevertheless preserved because he 
argued in his motion and at the hearing that confidence testimony was not probative of 
identification accuracy and that inclusion of witness confidence is "'particularly prejudicial 
because it reinforces and exploits juror misconceptions about the eyewitness process."' 
Rply. Brf. at 2 (quoting R. 73). However, these arguments were made in conjunction with 
defendant's argument that witness confidence should be excluded altogether under Long and 
its progeny. See R. 72-74; R. 253: 11-22. No argument was made that rule 403 precluded 
the evidence or that the evidence was relevant but it's "probative value [was] substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
This Court long ago held that "[wjhere there was no clear or specific objection on the 
basis of... unfair prejudice and the specific ground for objection was not clear from the 
context of the question or the testimony, the theory cannot be raised on appeal." State v. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
The State relied on this rule and did not argue the merits. See Aple. Brf. at 26. Under 
Pinder, therefore, the court of appeals should not have addressed his rule 403 claim. See 
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, Tf 45. Nor should this Court. This Court should follow Pinder, vacate 
the court of appeals's treatment of rule 403, and refuse to consider defendant's rule 403 
claim. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's rule 403 claim was preserved, it fails on the 
merits. Under rule 403, defendant must demonstrate that the probative value of the 
confidence testimony was "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ...." 
Utah R. Evid. 403. He has not done so. As discussed, there is a positive correlation between 
witness confidence and identification accuracy, albeit a modest one. This correlation is even 
stronger where there is extended exposure to the perpetrator's face. See Brigham, 
Wasserman, & Meissner, supra, at 18. Such was the case here. See R. 253: 132 (testifying 
that she looked at defendant some twenty times until defendant insisted that she keep her 
face down). Moreover, the trial court's Long instruction greatly minimized any danger of 
unfair prejudice. The Long instruction directed the jury to consider the Long factors in 
determining the reliability of the identification; it did not instruct the jury to consider witness 
confidence as a factor. See R. 171-73. There is no reason to believe the jury did not or could 
not follow that instruction. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (holding 
that the Court will normally presume the jury will follow the trial court's instructions unless 
there is an overwhelming probability the jury will be unable to do so). 
Moreover, as explained above, any alleged error in admitting the confidence 
testimony was harmless. See, supra, at 29. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
32 
Respectfully submitted May 3, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ggFFREY S. GRAY 
^^Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
^ - ^ ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 2, 2005,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent upon the defendant/petitioner, Luis A. Guzman, by causing them to be hand-
delivered to his counsel of record as follows: 
Lori J. Seppi 
Heather Johnson 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assfn 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 841111 
F:\Jgray\Guzman\Guzman Lui cert brf2.doc 
5/3/2005 9:55 AM 
Jfe^Fey S. Gray 
/^/Assistant Attorney General 
33 
ADDENDUM 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
This opinion is subject to revision before jyf^ J 2 k 2004 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Luis A. Guzman, 
Defendant and Appellant 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030019-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 24, 2004) 
2004 UT App 211 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: Heather Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne. 
ORME, Judge: 
Hi Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-G-302 
(2003), and aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (2003),x growing out of a 
home invasion robbery. Defendant primarily challenges the trial 
court's decision to let the victim testify how certain she was of 
her several identifications of Defendant. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
fl2 On April 18, 2001, the victim in this case, a young woman, 
was driving home from work to her South Salt Lake townhouse, 
1. "As a convenience to the reader, and because the provisions 
in effect at the relevant times do not differ materially from the 
statutory provisions currently in effect, we cite to the most 
recent statutory codifications throughout this opinion, unless 
otherwise noted." State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 527 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
where she lived with three roommates. Meanwhile, Defendant and 
six others, including Fernando Fernandez and a woman named 
Miguella, met at a park where they ingested cocaine and 
methamphetamine. The group decided they were going to raid a 
"known" drug house for cocaine and money. Defendant and Miguella 
were to gain entry first and then telephone the others to follow. 
The group parked down the street from the targeted house, and 
Defendant and Miguella walked toward the house while the others 
remained in the van. 
U3 As the victim approached her townhouse and turned into the 
driveway, she saw a man and woman, who were later identified as 
Defendant and Miguella, walking along the road toward her house. 
The victim pulled into her garage, shut off the engine of her 
car, and gathered her belongings. Defendant and Miguella entered 
the victim's garage, and Defendant knocked on the driver's side 
window of her car. The victim rolled down her window, and 
Defendant demanded money and drugs, showed her a handgun, and 
told her to shut the garage door. Defendant opened the car door, 
showed the victim that the gun was loaded, and put the gun to her 
head as he ordered her out of the car. 
^4 After the victim exited the car, Defendant took her cell 
phone and cigarettes, then pushed her onto the garage floor, and 
Miguella tied her hands and feet together while Defendant 
continued to point the gun at her and demand money and drugs. 
The victim offered the six dollars in her wallet and tried to 
explain that only she and her roommates lived there, and they had 
no money or drugs. 
1(5 Unpersuaded, Defendant went inside the house, leaving 
Miguella in the garage with the victim. Soon thereafter, the 
victim heard several other people moving around inside her house. 
Three of those individuals, one of whom had a "clown-jester-type" 
tattoo and was later identified as Fernandez, came to the doorway 
of the garage and peeked at the victim. After fifteen to twenty 
minutes of rummaging through the house, the group determined 
they were in the wrong house. They finally departed, taking some 
jewelry and an old cell phone. They left the victim tied up in 
the garage, and she eventually worked herself free, went inside 
to the kitchen, and vomited. 
H6 The victim reported the incident to the police, and an 
officer arrived, gathered some information, and enlisted the 
services of a crime scene technician. On May 23, 2001, more than 
a month after the incident, Detective Jewkes met with the victim 
and showed her a group of photographs. She promptly identified 
Defendant as the gunman. At trial, the victim testified that at 
the time of the identification she rated her confidence in her 
identification as a "10" on a scale of one to ten, and she stated 
that "[she] will never forget his face." She further testified 
that the man in the photo she picked had one eye that was "just 
kind of deformed," like the gunman's, and that "[e]verything 
about his face" was consistent with her memory of the gunman. 
Additionally at trial, Jewkes testified that at the time of the 
identification, the victim stated she was "100 percent positive" 
of her identification. 
U7 From a second photo array, the victim identified another 
man, Fernandez, as one of the robbers who had stood in the 
doorway of the garage. At trial, the victim testified that at 
the time of the photo lineup, she rated her confidence in this 
identification as a "six or seven," because she "didn't get to 
see his face very long," but added that she "will never forget 
[his] tattoo." Eight months later, the victim went to an in-
person lineup at the police station, and she again identified 
Defendant as the gunman. At trial, she testified that she was 
"100 percent" certain of this identification and was able to 
identify Defendant within "[s]econds, as soon as he walked out." 
%8 Both Fernandez and Defendant were originally charged with 
aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnaping, with weapons and 
"gang" enhancements. Fernandez entered into a plea agreement, 
and pursuant to the agreement, he pled guilty to one count of 
simple robbery in exchange for his testimony against Defendant. 
19 Before trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to 
preclude testimony about the victim's level of confidence in her 
two pretrial identifications of Defendant. The trial court heard 
oral arguments on this issue and denied the motion, concluding 
that the witness's confidence in her identifications was a factor 
that the jury could legitimately consider in evaluating the 
evidence. 
KlO At the close of trial, the court refused to give a jury 
instruction, requested by Defendant, concerning the jury's 
evaluation of Fernandez's testimony.2 The trial court determined 
2. The jury instruction requested by Defendant reads as follows: 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony 
of an informer who provides evidence against 
a defendant must be examined and weighed by 
you with greater care than the testimony of 
an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's 
testimony has been affected by interest or 
prejudice against the defendant is for you to 
determine. In making that determination, you 
should consider (1) whether the witness has 
received anything (including pay, immunity 
from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, 
(continued...) 
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that the instruction would direct the jury to pay special 
attention to a particular witness and, therefore, use of the jury 
instruction would be improper. However, the court did include an 
instruction regarding the jury's role in evaluating and weighing 
the credibility of all the witnesses.3 After due deliberation, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both the aggravated 
kidnaping and the aggravated robbery charges. It also found that 
Defendant used a firearm and acted in concert with two or more 
2. (...continued) 
personal advantage, or vindication) in 
exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in 
which the informant testified or offered 
statements against an individual but was not 
called, and whether the statements were 
admitted in that case, and whether the 
informant received any deal, promise, 
inducement or benefit in exchange for that 
testimony; (3) whether the informant has ever 
changed his or her testimony; (4) the 
criminal history of the informant; (5) any 
other evidence relevant to the informer's 
credibility. 
3. The jury instruction given reads as follows: 
You are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence. In judging the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of their 
testimony, you can take into consideration 
their bias, if any is shown, their interest, 
if any, in the result of the lawsuit, either 
as parties or otherwise, or any probable 
motive or lack thereof to testify as they do, 
if any is shown. You may consider whether 
any witness contradicted himself, the 
witnesses' deportment upon the witness stand, 
the reasonableness or lack thereof of their 
statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor or the want of it, their opportunity 
to know, their ability to understand, their 
capacity to remember and any other fact or 
circumstance which you believe may have a 
bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of 
the statements of witnesses, and determine 
therefrom, in accordance with your honest 
convictions, what weight and credibility you 
should give to the testimony of each witness, 
measured by reason and common sense and the 
rules set forth in these instructions. 
persons, subjecting him to enhanced penalties under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-3-203 and -203.1 (Supp. 2000).4 Defendant was 
subsequently sentenced to consecutive terms of six years to life 
imprisonment for aggravated robbery and fifteen years to life for 
aggravated kidnaping. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
fll Defendant argues that it was error to allow the victim and 
Detective Jewkes to testify as to the certainty of the victim's 
identifications of Defendant. The standard for 
reviewing a trial court!s decision to admit 
eyewitness identification testimony requires 
us to consider the record evidence and 
determine whether the admission of the 
identification is consistent with the due 
process guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,1122, 48 P. 3d 953. Thus, our review 
employs "a correctness standard, which incorporates a clearly 
erroneous standard for the review of subsidiary factual 
determinations." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n.3 (Utah 
1991). This standard of review applies to both federal and state 
due process analysis. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ^ [22. 
1[l2 Defendant also contends that the prejudicial effect of 
allowing the jury to hear the certainty testimony substantially 
outweighs its probative value. See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
11
 [B] alancing of the probative value against any prejudicial 
effect must necessarily rest within the sound discretion of the 
trial court; and the determination [it] makes thereon should 
not be disturbed on appeal unless there was clear abuse of 
discretion." State v.'Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Utah 1977) 
(footnote omitted). 
Ul3 Finally, Defendant argues that Utah and federal case law 
support the inclusion of a cautionary jury instruction regarding 
4. In April 2001, when the crimes were committed, the version of 
the statute in effect was the 2000 version. Subsequent 
amendments have no bearing on this case, although it should be 
noted that the 2003 amendment to section 76-3-203 "transferred 
the language dealing with dangerous weapons to a new section, 
Section 76-3-203.8." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 amendment note 
(2003) . 
an accomplice's credibility when he testifies as part of a plea 
bargain. A trial court's giving of a special cautionary 
instruction relating to corroborated accomplice testimony "is 
entirely discretionary with the [trial] court, C53 and we will 
reverse only when it has abused that discretion." State v. 
Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Certainty Testimony 
fl4 On appeal, Defendant's primary argument is that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to preclude any reference to 
the victim's level of confidence in her pretrial identifications 
of Defendant as the gunman. Defendant argues that there is no 
correlation between how certain a person feels about her 
identification and the actual accuracy of the identification. 
Therefore, he argues, certainty testimony should not be admitted 
given its inherent unreliability. Defendant contends that the 
admission of such testimony at. trial constituted prejudicial 
error, violated his due process rights under the Utah and United 
States Constitutions, and also violated Utah Rule of Evidence 
403. 
1fl5 In considering Defendant's argument, we must keep in mind 
the separate and distinct roles that the judge and the jury play 
in determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony under the 
due process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
"The judge, 'as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility of an 
identification,' is required to scrutinize proffered evidence for 
constitutional defects." State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 
(Utah 1991)). The judge "must preliminarily determine whether 
the identification is sufficiently reliable that its admission 
and consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due 
process." Id. Then, "if reliable and therefore admissible, the 
jury determines the credibility of that identification." Id. 
|^16 "We apply separate analyses when determining the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications under the Utah and Federal 
5. Even giving such an instruction concerning uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony is discretionary. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-7(2) (2003) ("In the discretion of the court, an instruction 
to the jury may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated 
testimony should be viewed with caution[.]") (emphasis added). 
In contrast, "such an instruction shall be given if the trial 
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable." Id. (emphasis added). 
Constitutions." State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
1. Federal Due Process 
Ul7 We begin with an analysis of whether Defendant's federal due 
process rights were violated. Defendant argues that under 
federal due process analysis, the admission of the evidence was 
in error because it "was unreliable and it undermined the jury's 
objective consideration of the eyewitness identification 
evidence." Under the federal constitutional standard, "the trial 
court . . . must preliminarily determine whether the 
identification is sufficiently reliable that its admission and 
consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due 
process." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. In determining reliability, 
"the court is to consider 'all the circumstances' surrounding the 
identification and appraise those circumstances in light of five 
factors which were identified by the United States Supreme Court 
in Bicraers as important to a determination of the reliability of 
an identification." Id. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 
93 S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972). As set forth in Bigcrers, 
the factors to be considered in evaluating 
the likelihood of misidentification include 
1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, 2) the 
witness' [s] degree of attention, 3) the 
accuracy of the witness'[s] prior description 
of the criminal, 4) the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and 5) the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation. 
409 U.S. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382 (emphasis and numbering added). 
Defendant's federal due process argument clearly fails because 
Biggers specifically recognizes "the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation" as a valid 
factor for a court to consider in determining the reliability of 
an identification. Id. 
2. State Due Process 
1[l8 "Utah's due process analysis pertaining to the 
constitutional reliability of eyewitness testimony is different 
than, but 'as stringent as, if not more stringent than, the 
federal analysis.'" State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784). Our Supreme Court 
has criticized and "specifically rejected the 'level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation' as a factor to 
be used in determining the constitutional reliability of an 
identification." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,^16, 20 P.3d 265 
9nn^nm Q-ra 
(quoting, without attribution, Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S. 
Ct. at 382). In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court itemized "areas of concern" that should be 
addressed in determining reliability under Utah due process 
analysis: 
1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; 2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; 3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; 4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and 5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. 
Id. at 493. "If the court finds the identification reliable in 
light of these five factors, then it is admissible under the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 
943. 
[^19 Defendant argues that because the level of confidence in an 
identification is not included as a factor to be considered by 
the court, the testimony regarding the victim's confidence in her 
identifications must not be admitted at trial at all. We believe 
Defendant's argument blurs the distinction between what the trial 
court must consider in determining whether the eyewitness 
identification evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted 
and what the jury may consider in weighing the credibility of 
such evidence if it is properly admitted. Defendant relies on 
several Utah cases to support his contentions. Although we 
disagree with Defendant's argument that these cases support his 
conclusion, we do think it is relevant to discuss each of these 
cases because they illuminate the path Utah case law has taken on 
this issue. 
[^20 Defendant cites State v. Long as a case that recognizes the 
"poor relationship between witness confidence and accuracy of 
identification." 721 P.2d at 490. In Long, the Utah Supreme 
Court was "presented with the question of the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications in the context of a claim that an 
instruction cautioning the jury about the fallibility of such 
identifications was required where the accuracy of an 
identification was at issue." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. To 
answer this question, the Court examined the numerous "empirical 
studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification," Long, 721 P.2d at 488, recognized the lack of 
awareness among juries of the inherent unreliability of this type 
of testimony, and concluded that "at a minimum, additional 
judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is 
warranted . . . whenever eyewitness identification is a central 
issue in a case." Id. at 492. 
1[21 The Court in Long "laid the foundation for a separate Utah 
constitutional due process analysis of the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. The 
Court concluded that failure to give a cautionary instruction, 
when eyewitness identification is a crucial issue, would "'deny 
the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution.'" Id. at 780 (quoting State v. Long, 721 
P.2d at 492) (emphasis omitted). This is significant because, 
prior to Long, the Court had "previously said that whether such-
instructions must be given in a particular case is a matter left 
largely to the discretion of the trial court." Long, 721 P.2d at 
487. See, e.g.. State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985) 
("[T]he question of whether such an instruction is required in a 
particular case has been left to the discretion of the trial 
courts."). 
[^22 Long recognized "the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification," 721 P.2d at 490, and determined that this 
potential problem can be ameliorated by mandating the trial court 
to include an appropriate jury instruction.6 The Long court 
offered a cautionary jury instruction7 that, " [i]f used, . . . 
would certainly satisfy [the Court's] expressed concerns about 
the need for cautionary instructions."8 Id. at 494-95. The 
6. Although the holding in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986), is relevant, it primarily focuses on the jury's role in 
evaluating and weighing the credibility of the eyewitness 
testimony and not the judge's role of determining the 
constitutional reliability, and thus the admissibility, of the 
evidence in the first place. Subsequent cases have more 
particularly focused on the judge's role'in admitting such 
evidence. 
7. It should be noted that the factors the Long court suggests 
be included in the jury instruction are the same factors the 
trial court considers in determining the reliability and 
admissibility of the identifications. The Long factors are 
applicable to both the judge's role in admitting the 
identification testimony and the jury's role in evaluating such 
testimony. 
8. The approved jury instruction can be found in footnote 8 of 
the Long opinion. See 721 P.2d at 494-95 n.8. The Long 
(continued...) 
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Court did not conclude that certainty testimony must be wholly 
excluded from trial. Nor did the Court suggest the five "areas 
of concern" it identified were an exhaustive list of eyewitness 
identification criteria, as those factors were characterized as 
"example [s]" of the difficulty such testimony presents, and the 
jury instruction the Court approved by no means mirrored the 
"areas of concern." Id. at 49 3. 
1(23 Next, Defendant cites to State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774 
(Utah 1991), as support for his argument. In Ramirez, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that the "[p]otential for role confusion 
and for erosion of constitutional guarantees inheres in this 
overlap of responsibility of judge and jury to determine the same 
issue." Id. at 778. The Court stated that "courts cannot 
properly sidestep nheir responsibility to perform the required 
constitutional admissibility analysis," id., because "[t]he 
danger of such an abdication of responsibility is particularly 
serious where the admissibility of an eyewitness identification 
is concerned." Id. at 779. 
|^24 The Court compared the factors identified in Long to those 
that originated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 
(1972). Ramirez distinguished "[tjhe analytical model to be 
followed under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution," 
817 P. 2d at 781, from the Bicraers factors and concluded that 
"Long teaches that we do not agree entirely with the Bicraers 
listing of the relevant criteria for determining the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications." Id. at 780. "In Biggers, the 
[United States Supreme] Court listed as a factor 'the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, ' " id. 
at 781 (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382), 
while "[i]n Long, we criticized this factor and essentially 
rejected it as an indicator of an identification's reliability." 
Id. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490. The Court in Ramirez concluded 
that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable." 817 P.2d at 781. 
8. (...continued) 
instruction discusses the importance of identifying the defendant 
as the person who committed the crime and the prosecution's role 
in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime. See id. Additionally, it states 
that multiple factors can affect the accuracy of a witnessfs 
identification of the defendant as the person who committed the 
crime. See id. The instruction includes most of the Long 
factors, as well as additional, more specific, factors to be 
considered when examining the evidence. See id. 
1J25 In Ramirez, unlike in Long, see supra note 6, the court was 
primarily focused on the trial court's role in deciding to admit 
such testimony rather than the jury's role in considering it if 
admitted. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-80. However, despite its 
criticism of including certainty in the context of passing on the 
admissibility of such evidence under state due process analysis, 
the Court did not state that certainty testimony was so 
unreliable that it must be excluded from trial altogether. In 
other words, the trial court's mandated appraisal of reliability 
for purposes of admissibility does not include the witness's 
self-described certainty, but it does not follow that the jury 
should be prevented from knowing the witness's own estimation of 
her certainty. 
^26 Defendant next cites to State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, 20 
P.3d 265, in which a witness identified the defendant prior to 
trial and, at the time, rated his level of certainty in the 
identification as a "'nine and a half" on a ten point scale. 
Id. at 1[7. A t the preliminary hearing, the witness testified 
that although "he had positively identified defendant as the 
robber at the showup identification on the night of the robbery," 
he later became less certain of his confidence in the 
identification. Id. at ^9. The trial court subsequently granted 
the defendant's motion to suppress this eyewitness identification 
testimony, but ruled that the witness was "allowed to testify 
about the facts and circumstances surrounding the showup 
identification." Id. at f10. "At trial, [the witness] testified 
that he was 'pretty positive' that defendant was the robber at 
the time of the showup, telling [the officer] that he was 'a nine 
and a half on a ten point scale, in terms of the degree of his 
certainty." Id. at [^18 n.3 (emphasis omitted)'. 
^27 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred 
in "admitting into evidence the underlying facts of the showup 
identification," id. at ^12, and the Utah Supreme Court agreed 
that it was erroneous "to admit evidence of the showup procedure 
after granting the motion to suppress and concluding that the 
showup . . . did not satisfy the Ramirez factors for 
constitutional reliability." Id. at Hl6. The Court ruled that 
"allowing the victim to testify about the underlying facts of the 
showup was erroneous," id. at ^17, given the trial court's 
previous ruling on the evidence's admissibility. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court concluded this inconsistency was harmless error 
because its own application of the Long factors resulted in the 
determination that the evidence "met the threshold test for 
constitutional reliability," and therefore, "all evidence of the 
showup could [properly] have been admitted." Id. at ^19. 
1|28 In its application of the Long factors, the Court 
characterized the witness's testimony that "he was 'pretty 
positive' that defendant was the robber at the time of the 
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showup, " and that the witness was "'a nine and a half on a ten 
point scale, in terms of the degree of his certainty," id. at ^18 
n.3 (emphasis omitted), as evidence that the "identification was 
made spontaneously," "remained consistent," and was not "the 
product of suggestion." Id. at Hl8. Although the Court did not 
specifically state that the witness's certainty testimony was 
properly admitted as such, it included the evidence in its 
application of the Long factors in concluding that "the showup 
identification could have been admitted in its entirety." Id. at 
i[l7 (emphasis added) . 
1f2 9 Although Defendant only briefly mentioned State v. Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953, as supporting his argument, that case is 
particularly insightful and merits a full discussion in resolving 
the issue before us. In Hubbard, the Ucah Supreme Court stated 
that "[w]hile these [Long] factors provide guidance, the list is 
certainly not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may 
be considered in determining whether an identification is 
reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process." 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ^27. The Court applied the Loner factors 
to the facts of the case and "conclude[d] that the pretrial 
photo identification was sufficiently reliable such that 
defendant's due process rights were not violated by permitting 
[i.e., admitting] the identification testimony of [the two 
eyewitnesses]." Id. at ^28. 
%30 In the Court's examination of the Long factor dealing with 
"whether the witness[es!] identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter," State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
493 (Utah 1986), the Court included the witnesses' certainty 
testimony as being illustrative of its reliability. In its 
analysis, the Court noted: "When asked to describe his certainty 
to [the officer, the first witness] said, 'I'm positive.' [The 
second witness] immediately identified defendant and indicated her 
level of certainty as seven on the ten point scale." Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45 at ^28. The Court concluded that the "witness 
identifications were not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion of 
the identification testimony from consideration by the jury. " Id. 
at 1[3 0. The Court's analysis in Hubbard suggests that not only 
can certainty testimony be considered by a jury in evaluating 
eyewitness identification testimony otherwise properly admitted, 
but it can be considered by the trial court as it considers 
admissibility if it assists the court in determining whether the 
eyewitness identification was sufficiently reliable. Thus, the 
trial court, in its gatekeeping function, determines "whether the 
proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it can be 
presented to the jury for their deliberation," id. at U3 0, and "it 
is the role of the jury to decide how much weight to give the 
testimony of particular witnesses." Id. at 1(15. We agree that 
the weight to be given certainty evidence in identification cases 
is best considered by the jury in determining the credibility of a 
witness's testimony. "Courts need not, nor should they, step into 
the province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of 
identification for the jurors." Id. at 1(30. 
1f3l We reject Defendant's argument that certainty testimony may 
not be admitted at trial at all. The cases Defendant cites,9 far 
from supporting his argument that certainty testimony must not be 
admitted because of its inherent unreliability, actually 
establish these principles: (1) certainty testimony is not a 
separate admissibility factor under Loner and Ramirez; (2) 
certainty testimony may nonetheless be relevant in the trial 
court's admissibility assessment, insofar as it sheds light on 
the spontaneity/consistency admissibility factor; and (3) 
certainty testimony is, in any event, relevant once the 
eyewitness identification is deemed admissible, insofar as it 
assists the jury's evaluation of the credibility of the 
identification testimony and the weight to be accorded it. 
3. Rule 403 
1(32 Defendant's last argument regarding certainty testimony is 
that its admiss ion violated rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Defendant argues that the probative value of the 
victim's certainty testimony is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect on the jury. Rule 403 states: "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
9. To support his argument regarding the inherent deficiencies 
of certainty testimony, Defendant also cites to Utah cases that 
he contends prevented him from presenting expert testimony at 
trial to educate the jury about these deficiencies. See, e.g., 
State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,^41-44, 27 P.3d 1133 (noting 
that the requirement that the trial court give a cautionary jury 
instruction "'has not extended . . . to include additional expert 
testimony concerning eyewitness identification'") (quoting State 
v. Kinsev, 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)). Defendant alleges that this limitation 
on expert testimony further emphasizes the need to exclude 
certainty testimony because the jury has no other means of 
learning of its unreliability. We disagree with the premise. We 
think that in appropriate cases expert testimony could be allowed 
to advise a jury of the potential unreliability of certainty 
testimony. See, e.g.. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,1(14, 48 P.3d 
953 ("We have not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of 
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification."). In this 
case, however, Defendant did not seek the admission of expert 
testimony regarding the confidence/accuracy correlation, and we 
conclude that the cautionary jury instruction given, which was 
modeled after the example in Long, was adequate to advise the 
jury of the problems with eyewitness identification testimony. 
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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. "When 
applying rule 403, it is necessary to determine first whether the 
proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). "If not, we indulge a presumption 
in favor of admissibility." Id. at 1221-22. We only overturn 
the court's determination if it is "'beyond the limits of 
reasonability'" and, even if it is, if admission of the evidence 
was prejudicial. Id. at 1221 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). 
[^33 Defendant fails to cite any Utah cases supporting his 
argument that, under rule 403, certainty testimony "has an 
unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the 
jury," id., nor has he otherwise persuaded us that such is the 
case. "Rule 403 is not to be used to allow the trial judge to 
substitute his assessment of the credibility of testimony for 
that of the jury by excluding testimony simply because he does 
not find it credible." State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct. 1597 (1988). 
"The trial judge was correct in allowing the jury to assess the 
credibility of the eyewitness" rather than to make that 
determination on his own.10 Id. We conclude that the trial 
court!s decision to permit the certainty testimony in the face of 
a Rule 403 challenge was well within the limits of reasonability. 
B. Cautionary Jury Instruction 
|^34 Defendant also argues on appeal that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give the cautionary jury instruction Defendant 
submitted regarding the testimony of Fernandez, who testified at 
trial against Defendant as part of a plea agreement. Defendant 
argues that the cautionary instruction would have advised the 
jury to carefully evaluate Fernandez's testimony, in light of his 
plea agreement and his status as an accomplice, without implying 
that his testimony was unbelievable. Defendant argues that not 
10. In ruling on Defendant's motion in limine, the trial court 
stated that "I think the jury would want to know how confident 
the witness was in their identification. They may choose to 
believe it. At least they are entitled to know how confident the 
witness is." We agree with the trial court--and so, surely, 
would Defendant if the thrust of the witness's testimony was that 
she was not very certain of her identification of Defendant or if 
she characterized the level of her certainty as only being a two 
or three on a scale of one to ten. 
only is the use of an instruction, such as the one he submitted, 
supported by federal and Utah case law and the rules of evidence 
but, moreover, it is necessary to enlighten the jury about 
Fernandez's motivation to lie and his untrustworthiness. 
1f35 According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003), a 
cautionary instruction may be given if the accomplice testimony 
is "uncorroborated" and shall be given if the trial judge finds 
the accomplice testimony "self-contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable." See supra note 5 & accompanying text. See also 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) (stating that 
defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to request 
an accomplice instruction given the substantial evidence 
supporting his conviction). 
|^36 While it is true that Fernandez's story and, subsequently, 
his testimony at trial varied from time to time, the testimony of 
the victim was, for the most part, consistent with and served to 
corroborate Fernandez's testimony. Such corroboration means 
section 77-17-7 did not apply, by its own terms, although even in 
the case of corroborated accomplice testimony, giving such an 
instruction is discretionary. See State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 
782 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Where the testimony is 
corroborated, we would of course be especially reluctant to find 
an abuse of discretion in the failure to give such an 
instruction, and we see no abuse of discretion here. 
^37 In this case, such an instruction was simply not necessary 
to prompt the jury to question Fernandez's veracity. Fernandez 
himself admitted in testimony before the jury that he had lied to 
the police on numerous occasions about his involvement in the 
robbery and that he entered into a plea agreement with the State, 
in which he was allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges in 
exchange for his testimony at trial against Defendant. This 
testimony alerted the jury to Fernandez's possible motive for 
testifying with less than total candor. Additionally, the jury 
was informed that Fernandez had previously been convicted of a 
felony and had served time in prison on an unrelated conviction. 
|^3 8 The jury was also instructed generally about its obligations 
in judging the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. Specifically, the court instructed the jury that it 
was allowed to take into consideration a witness's bias, 
interests, motives to testify, contradictions of themselves, 
candor, or any other fact or circumstance which the jurors 
believed had an impact on the witness's truthfulness and 
accuracy. "We have held that it 'is not error to refuse a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the 
other instructions.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 
1993) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). 
We conclude that between Fernandez's own admissions and the 
OC\c\i n m Q r»7v 
general instruction given on evaluating witness testimony, the 
jury was adequately apprised that Fernandez's testimony was to be 
taken with a grain of salt. We see no error in the trial court's 
refusal to give the additional instruction requested by 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
i|39 Defendant's federal and state due process rights were not 
violated by the admission of the victim's and Detective Jewkes's 
testimony regarding the victim's confidence in her pretrial 
identifications of Defendant as the gunman. Nor did the trial 
court exceed the bounds of sound discretion in determining that 
the certainty testimony's potential for unfair prejudice did not 
outweigh its probative value. Lastly, we conclude that the jury 
instruction given on weighing and judging the credibility of all 
witnesses was adequate to advise the jury how to evaluate 
Fernandez's testimony, especially given that the need for caution 
was evident from his own testimony. Therefore, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an additional 
cautionary jury instruction. 
<ji41 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr.,/Oudge 
11. As we have concluded that none of the claimed errors were 
errors in actuality, it follows that Defendant's cumulative error 
argument is also unavailing. 
